CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES by BAYAR, Yilmaz & ALAKBAROV, Naib
ECOFORUM 
[Volume 5, Issue 2 (9), 2016] 
303 
 
 Yilmaz BAYAR 
Usak University, Department of Economics, Usak, Turkey  
yilmaz.bayar@usak.edu.tr 
Naib ALAKBAROV 




This study investigates the interaction between corruption and foreign direct investment inflows in 23 emerging 
market economies during the period 2002-2014 by employing Westerlund-Durbin-Hausman (2008) 
cointegration test. We found that control of corruption and rule of law had no statistically significant impact on 
attraction of foreign direct investments in overall panel. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have become an important external financing source especially 
for the emerging market economies and developing countries as of mid-1980s. In this regard, global FDI inflows 
was about $1.2 trillion in 2014 and about half of total FDI flows went to the emerging market economies 
(UNCTAD, 2015a). The significant increases in global FDI flows have many implications for the countries such 
as technology spillovers, improvements in human capital, facilitating the access to global markets, increasing the 
competitiveness. Therefore, determination of macroeconomic and institutional determinants of FDI inflows also 
gained importance for the countries to attract more FDI flows. One of the important institutional determinants 
has been found to be corruption. There are two main views on the impact of corruption on FDI inflows. One 
view suggests that corruption affects FDI inflows negatively, because corruption increases the costs and weakens 
transparency, property rights and competitive environment and prevents efficiently functioning of the 
governments. On the other hand the other view suggests that corruption affects FDI inflows positively, because 
corruption can eliminate the problems arising from poor institutions and regulations (Bellos and Subasat, 2011). 
Many countries especially developing and emerging market economies see the FDI inflows as a key to 
development considering the benefits of FDI inflows. Therefore they have liberalized their economies and made 
many structural reforms to meet the requirements of foreign investors. In this regard, we investigated the 
interaction among corruption, rule of law and FDI inflows in emerging market economies during 2002-2014 
period employing panel data analysis. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section mainly 
outlines the empirical literature review on the nexus between corruption and FDI inflows. Section 3 introduces 
the data and method, Section 4 gives empirical findings. Finally Section 5 concludes the study.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A large number of studies have been conducted to see the impact and determinants of FDI flows. The 
studies about the determinants of FDI flows have focused on the macroeconomic and institutional determinants 
and the studies have revealed that market size, population, growth prospects, financial development, inflation, 
real exchange rate, openness, trade openness, human capital, institutional quality, infrastructure, political 
stability and taxes (Bayar and Ozel, 2014). In this study, we focused the literature on the institutional 
determinants of FDI inflows, because we investigated the relationship between corruption and FDI inflows in 
emerging market economies. The empirical literature showed that most of the studies have investigated the 
interaction between corruption and FDI flows by employing panel data analysis and reached mixed findings. 
However, most of the studies also revealed that corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows (Al-Sadig, 2009; 
Brada et al. 2012; Pupovic, 2012; Kersan-Škabić, 2013; Castro and Nunes, 2013; Quazi, 2014), while relatively 
few studies have found no statistically significant relationship between corruption and FDI inflows (Bellos and 
Subasat, 2011; Mudambi et al., 2013; Helmy, 2013). 
Nilsson-Hakkala et al. (2008) examined the impact of corruption on horizontal and vertical FDI with data 
of Swedish firm level using panel regression and found that corruption had negative impact on FDI and the 
impact was bigger in case of horizontal FDIs relative to the vertical ones. On the other hand Al-Sadig (2009) 
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examined the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 117 countries during 1984-2004 period using panel 
regression and found that corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows. But he also found that the impact of 
corruption eliminated when the institutional quality of host country was controlled. Woo (2010) also examined 
the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 90 countries during 1984-2004 period using panel regression and 
found that corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows.  
In another study, Bellos and Subasat (2011) investigated the interaction between FDI inflows and 
corruption in 15 transition economies during 1990-2005 period using panel gravity model and found that 
corruption had no statistically significant impact on FDI inflows. On the other hand Samimi and Monfared 
(2011) examined the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in16 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation countries 
during 2002-2008 period using panel regression and found a negative relationship between corruption and FDI 
inflows. Buchanan et al. (2012) also examined the interaction between FDI and institutional quality in 164 
countries during 1996-2006 period using panel regression and found that institutional quality had positive impact 
on FDI.  
Brada et al. (2012) examined the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 84 host countries during 2000-
2003 period and found that corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows. On the other hand Pupovic (2012) 
also examined the impact of corruption in FDI inflows in Montenegro using questionnaire method and concluded 
that corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows. Alemu (2012) also investigated the impact of corruption on 
FDI inflows in 16 Asian countries during 1995-2009 period using panel regression and found that corruption had 
negative impact on FDI inflows.  
Saidi et al. (2013) investigated the relationship between institutional variables and FDI inflows in 20 
developed and developing countries during 1998-2011 period employing panel regression and found that 
political stability and regulatory quality had positive impact on FDI inflows. On the other hand Kersan-Škabić 
(2013) also examined the institutional determinants of FDI inflows in 8 south east European countries during 
2001-2010 period employing panel regression and found that corruption had significant impact on FDI inflows. 
On the other hand Castro and Nunes (2013) investigated the interaction among corruption and FDI inflows in 73 
countries during 1998-2008 period employing panel regression and found that countries with lower corruption 
attracted more FDI flows. Mudambi et al. (2013) also investigated the interaction among government regulation, 
corruption and FDI in 55 countries during 1985-2000 period using panel regression and found that corruption 
had no independent impact on FDI inflows. 
Helmy (2013) investigated the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 21 Middle East and North African 
countries during 2003-2009 period using panel regression and found that corruption had no significant impact on 
FDI inflows. On the other hand Quazi (2014) examined the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 14 East and 
South Asian countries during 1995-2011 period using panel regression and found that corruption had negative 
impact FDI inflows. Finally Lucke and Eichler (2016) investigated the institutional determinants of FDI in 94 
countries during 1995-2009 period employing panel regression and found that regulatory quality and economic 
freedom had positive impact on FDI inflows. 
III. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY  
We investigated the relationship among FDI inflows, control of corruption and rule of law in 23 emerging 
market economies (Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates) during 2002-2014 period using Westerlund-Durbin-Hausman (2008) cointegration test. 
The countries and the data period in our study were determined by data availability. 
 
3.1. Data  
We used the annual data of FDI net inflows as percent of GDP as a proxy for FDI inflows. Additionally, 
we used control of corruption as a proxy for corruption and rule of law from WGI (World Governance 
Indicators). The indicators in question are based on 31 data sources reporting the perceptions of governance held 
by a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide (see Kaufmann et al. (2010) for 
detailed information). The indexes of the each indicator vary between -2.5 (weak) and 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance. The variables used in the econometric analysis, their symbols and data sources are presented in 
Table 1. We used Stata 14.0 and Gauss 11.0 software packages for the econometric analysis. 
 
Table 1: Data description 
Variables Symbol Source 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) FDI World Bank (2015a) and UNCTAD 
(2015b)  
Rule of law ROL World Bank (2015b) 
Control of corruption COC 
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3.2. Econometric methodology 
 
Cross-sectional dependency and homogeneity among the variables exhibit importance for selection of 
further econometric tests used in the analysis such as unit root test and cointegration test. Therefore, first we 
tested cross-sectional independency among the series with LM CD test of Pesaran (2004) because N (cross-
section dimension) =23 is higher than T(time dimension)=13 and tested homogeneity with adjusted delta tilde 
tests by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008). Later we analyzed integration levels of the variables with CIPS unit root 
test of Pesaran (2007) that regards cross-sectional dependence. Then we investigated long run relationship 
among unemployment, financial sector development and gross capital formation with Westerlund-Durbin-
Hausman (2008) cointegration test, because heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependency were found in 
econometric analysis of dataset. Finally we estimated long run cointegrating coefficients with Augmented Mean 
Group (AMG) estimator (Eberhardt and Bond, 2009; Eberhardt and Teal, 2010, 2011).  
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
4.1. Cross-sectional dependency and homogeneity tests 
We employed LM CD test of Pesaran (2004) because T (time dimension)=13 is lower than N (cross-
sectional dimension)=23 in the dataset and suggests the following test statistic exhibiting an asymptotically 
normal distribution (𝐻0: there is cross-sectional independency): 










We tested cross-sectional independency among the series with LM CD test of Pesaran (2004) and the 
results were introduced in Table 2. The null hypothesis, there is cross-sectional independence, was rejected at 1% 
significance level, because p value was found to be 0.0003. So we revealed a cross-section dependence among 
the series. Furthermore, we analyzed homogeneity with delta tilte test and adjusted delta tilde test of Pesaran and 
Yamagata (2008) and our findings revealed that null hypothesis, there is homogeneity, was rejected and the 
coefficients were found to be heterogenous. 
 
Table 2. Results of cross-sectional dependence and homogeneity tests 
Cross-sectional dependency tests 
Test Statistic p-value 
LM (Breusch and Pagan (1980)) 302.5 0.0178 
LM adj* (Pesaran et al. (2008)) 0.5611 0.5748 
LM CD* (Pesaran (2004)) 3.597 0.0003 
Homogeneity tests 
Test Statistic p-value 
Delta_tilde 3.396 0.000 
Delta_tilde_adj 4.236 0.000 
*two-sided test 
Source: own calculations in STATA v. 14. 
 
4.3. Panel unit root test 
We analyzed integration levels of the variables by CIPS (Cross-sectionally augmented IPS) (Im- Pesaran- 
Shin, 2003) unit root test of Pesaran (2007), because we revealed a cross-sectional dependency among the series. 
The test exhibits an asymptotically normal distribution and is calculated as follows: 




We conducted CIPS test and the results were given in Table 3. The findings indicated that fdi, coc and rol were 
I(1).  
 
Table 3. CIPS unit root test results 
Variables Constant Constant + Trend 
fdi -0.652 (0.257) -0.515 (0.303) 
d(fdi) -6.827 (0.000)* -4.803 (0.000)* 
coc 1.270 (0.898) 0.253 (0.600) 
d(coc) -3.728 (0.000)* -2.257 (0.012)** 
rol 3.356 (1.000) 1.683 (0.954) 
d(rol) -5.199 (0.000)* -2.579 (0.005)* 
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*, ** respectively significance at 1% and 5% level 
Source: own calculations in STATA v. 14. 
4.4. Westerlund-Durbin-Hausman (2008) cointegration test 
 
We employed Westerlund-Durbin-Hausman (2008) cointegration test to investigate the cointegrating 
relationship among the series with different integration levels as long as dependent variable is not I(0) and also 
test regards heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependency. The test calculates two statistics called as Durbin-
Hausman group statistic based on panel heterogeneity and Durbin-Hausman panel statistic based on panel 
homogeneity. We analyzed the cointegrating relationship among the variables by Westerlund-Durbin-Hausman 
(2008) cointegration test regarding heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence and our findings were given in 
Table 4. We regarded group statistic, because our panel was heterogeneous and it indicated that the null 
hypothesis (𝐻0: there is not any cointegration for all variables) was rejected and there was cointegration for some 
units. 
Table 4 – Results of Westerlund-Durbin-Hausman (2008) cointegration test 




Durbin-Hausman Panel Statistic 2.493 0.006 
Source: own calculations in Gauss v. 11. 
 
4.5 Long run cointegrating coefficients 
 
We estimated long run cointegrating coefficient by AMG estimator which regards heterogeneity and 
cross-sectional dependency and the results were presented in Table 5. The results indicated that both control of 
corruption and rule of lawa had no significant impact on FDI inflows in overall panel. However, individual 
cointegrating coefficients indicated that control of corruption had positive impact on FDI inflows in Philippines 
and Qatar, while control of corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows in Indonesia and Poland. On the other 
hand rule of law had positive impact on FDI inflows in Brazil, Chile and Indonesia, while rule of law had 
negative impact on FDI inflows in Greece and Qatar. 
 




Coefficient P value Coefficient P value 
Brazil 0.3304266 0.896 6.023693 0.002*** 
Chile -6.223355 0.319 34.9968 0.000*** 
China -2.713021 0.475 -2.08093 0.694 
Colombia -4.026392 0.359 -0.6990449 0.830 
Czech Republic 8.315086 0.458 -4.567332 0.593 
Egypt -9.030506 0.135 4.000646 0.159 
Greece 2.687588 0.249 -6.173745 0.069* 
Hungary -30.29081 0.586 73.49066 0.244 
India 0.8719697 0.913 -7.122544 0.263 
Indonesia -7.992687 0.034** 11.42704 0.005*** 
Korea 2.234415 0.668 -0.8769095 0.887 
Malaysia 0.9213396 0.810 8.055032 0.436 
Mexico -1.375251 0.611 6.05651 0.106 
Peru -1.4959 0.685 6.669247 0.215 
Philippines 4.917141 0.091* -0.3448438 0.939 
Poland -14.43515 0.070* 9.932988 0.196 
Qatar 10.30169 0.000*** -17.20858 0.000*** 
Russia -1.050262 0.653 4.862663 0.171 
South Africa -1.997897 0.170 -7.139258 0.274 
Taiwan 0.3891324 0.907 3.154189 0.357 
Thailand 5.318322 0.229 1.066509 0.663 
Turkey 0.3092084 0.790 1.615465 0.722 
United Arab Emirates -1.453999 0.811 -2.136438 0.736 
Panel -1.977779 0.250 5.347905 0.760 
 ***, ** and * respectively denotes that they are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
 Source: own calculations in STATA v. 14. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
FDI inflows have become an important external financing source for emerging market economies and 
developing countries. Therefore, emerging market economies and developing countries have made many 
structural reforms to attract more FDI inflows and in turn implement economic development considering 
possible positive effects of FDI inflows on their economy. Corruption and rule of law have been revealed as the 
main determinants of FDI inflows in host country from the theoretical and empirical studies. In this study, we 
examined the interaction among corruption, rule of law and FDI inflows in emerging market economies during 
2002-2014 period by employing Westerlund-Durbin-Hausman (2008) cointegration test. The results suggested 
that there was long run relationship among the variables, but both control of corruption and rule of law had no 
statistically significant impact on FDI inflows in overall panel. However, individual cointegrating coefficients 
indicated that control of corruption had positive impact on FDI inflows in Philippines and Qatar, while control of 
corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows in Indonesia and Poland. On the other hand rule of law had 
positive impact on FDI inflows in Brazil, Chile and Indonesia, while rule of law had negative impact on FDI 
inflows in Greece and Qatar. 
Our findings were found to be consistent with the findings of Bellos and Subasat (2011), Mudambi et al. 
(2013) and Helmy (2013), but inconsistent with the findings of most of the studies in the literature. We evaluated 
that this can be resulted from the country specific properties and also the impact of corruption and rule of law on 
FDI inflows can be varied depending on the types of FDI inflows (vertical and horizontal). Therefore, future 
studies can be conducted to see the impact of corruption and rule of law on vertical and horizontal FDI inflows. 
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